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 Abstract
Lending specialization on certain industry sectors can have opposing eects on monitoring
(including screening) abilities and on the sectoral concentration risk of a credit portfolio.
In this paper, we examine in the rst part if monitoring abilities of German cooperative
banks and savings banks increase with their specialization on certain industry sectors. We
observe that sectoral specialization generally entails better monitoring quality, particularly
in the case of the cooperative banks. In the second part we measure the overall eect of
better monitoring and the associated higher sectoral credit concentrations on the credit
risk of the portfolio. Our empirical results suggest that specialization benets overcom-
pensate the impact of higher credit concentrations in the case of the cooperative banks.
For savings banks, the results on the net eect depend on how specialization is measured.
If specialization is gauged by Hirschman Herndahl indices, the net eect is an increase of
portfolio risk due to the higher sectoral concentration. If specialization is instead measured
by distance measures, portfolio risk decreases as the impact of better monitoring abilities
prevails.
Key Words:
bank lending, loan portfolio, diversication, expected loss, savings banks, cooperative
banks, concentration, economic capital, credit risk.
JEL Classication: G11, G21.Non-technical summary
Previous empirical work indicates that banks specializing in specic industry sectors in
their corporate lending possess above average screening and monitoring abilities. This
means that they can better assess the credit quality of their borrowers and and monitor it
up to maturity. Specialization in industry sectors can have opposing eects on the credit
risk of a portfolio. On the one hand, portfolio risk ceteris paribus decreases because of
below-average default probabilities and above-average recovery rates at default, both due
to better knowledge and information. On the other hand, the higher portfolio share of
certain sectors due to the specialization ceteris paribus increases sector concentration and
the credit risk of the portfolio. In this discussion paper, we analyze which of the two
eects prevails. We thereby bring together two strands of literature: empirical work on
specialization benets that has hitherto been concerned with the expected loss and the
literature on risk modelling for credit portfolios that is concerned with the occurrence of
rare but severe losses, i.e. an extreme quantile of the distribution. The rst-time use of
portfolio risk models and the value-at-risk measure in this context is a prerequisite in order
to capture the concentration risk that materializes exactly in rare and severe loss events
and which has been disregarded in the rst strand of the literature.
The discussion paper makes two important research contributions: In the rst part, the
impact of specialization on the screening and monitoring abilities is analyzed empirically.
In the second part, we explore the overall impact of specialization benets and the higher
sectoral concentration involved on the credit risk of the portfolio. The empirical analyses
are based on yearly single bank data of German cooperative banks and savings banks for
the time period from 1995 to 2006.
The results support the hypothesis that specialized cooperative banks and savings banks
can reap signicant monitoring benets. This nding is conrmed by various robustness
checks using dierent indicator variables. The results dier between cooperative banks
and savings banks concerning the overall eect of monitoring benets and higher sectoral
concentration on portfolio risk. For cooperative banks, a higher degree of specialization
reduces the portfolio risk in spite of a higher sectoral concentration in a statistically and
economically signicant way. In the case of savings banks, the results instead depend
strongly on the applied specialization measure. For the Herndahl-Hirschman-Index as
specialization measure, the portfolio risk is overall increased due to specialization whereas
it is reduced for distance measures. The results are distinctly less signicant compared with
those for cooperative banks. In summary, we nd empirical support that it is possible for
at least a substantial number of banks to overcompensate the higher sectoral concentration
risk implied by a specialized lending strategy through the associated monitoring benets.
1Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Fr uhere empirische Forschungsarbeiten liefern Hinweise, dass Banken, die sich im Fir-
menkundenkreditgesch aft auf bestimmte Branchen spezialisieren,  uber  uberdurchschnitt-
liche Screening- und Monitoring-F ahigkeiten verf ugen. Dies bedeutet, dass sie besser als
nicht spezialisierte Institute die Kreditqualit at ihrer Kreditnehmer beurteilen und f ur die
Dauer der Kreditbeziehung verfolgen k onnen. Branchen-Spezialisierung kann allerdings
gegenl auge Auswirkungen auf das Kreditrisiko des Portfolios haben. Einerseits ver-
ringert sie ceteris paribus das Portfoliorisiko aufgrund von im Mittel niedrigeren Ausfall-
wahrscheinlichkeiten und h oheren Verwertungserl osen bei Kreditausf allen als Folge der
Wissens- und Informationsvorteile. Andererseits verst arken die aufgrund der Spezial-
isierung h oheren Portfolioanteile einzelner Sektoren ceteris paribus die Sektorkonzentration
und erh ohen damit das Kreditrisiko des Portfolios. In dem vorliegenden Diskussionspa-
pier untersuchen wir, welcher dieser beiden Eekte  uberwiegt. Damit werden zwei Lite-
raturstr ange verbunden: empirische Arbeiten zu Spezialisierungsvorteilen, die als Zielgr oe
den erwarteten (mittleren) Verlust verwenden, und die Literatur zur Risikomodellierung
von Kreditportfolien, die sich mit dem Eintritt seltener, aber daf ur hoher Verluste, d.h.
mit einer Flanke der Verlustverteilung besch aftigt. Die erstmalige Verwendung von Port-
foliorisikomodellen und des Value-at-Risk-Maes ist in diesem Zusammenhang eine Vo-
raussetzung, um die im ersten Literaturstrang vernachl assigten Konzentrationsrisiken, die
gerade bei seltenen, hohen Verlustereignissen schlagend werden, angemessen zu erfassen.
Das Diskussionspapier liefert zwei wesentliche Forschungsbeitr age: Im ersten Teil wird
der Einuss der Branchenspezialisierung auf die Screening- und Monitoring-F ahigkeiten
empirisch untersucht. Im zweiten Teil untersuchen wir den Gesamteekt aus Spezia-
lisierungsvorteilen und der damit verbundenen h oheren Sektorkonzentration auf das Kre-
ditrisiko des Portfolios. Die empirischen Untersuchungen basieren auf j ahrlichen Einzel-
bankdaten f ur deutsche Kreditgenossenschaften und Sparkassen im Zeitraum von 1995 bis
2006.
Die Ergebnisse st utzen die Hypothese, dass spezialisierte Kreditgenossenschaften und
Sparkassen Monitoring-Vorteile besitzen. Dies wird durch zahlreiche Robustheitspr ufun-
gen unter Verwendung unterschiedlicher Kennziern best atigt. Bez uglich des Gesamt-
eektes aus Monitoring-Vorteilen und h oheren Sektorkonzentrationen auf das Portfolio-
risiko weichen die Ergebnisse f ur Kreditgenossenschaften und Sparkassen voneinander ab.
Ein h oherer Spezialisierungsgrad senkt bei Kreditgenossenschaften trotz der h oheren Sek-
torkonzentration das Portfoliorisiko in statistisch und  okonomisch signikantem Umfang.
Im Falle der Sparkassen h angen die Resultate dagegen stark von dem verwendeten Spezia-
lisierungsma ab. Bei Herndahl-Hirschman-Indizes als Spezialisierungsma erh oht sich
im Gesamteekt das Portfoliorisiko mit der Spezialisierung, w ahrend es f ur Distanzmae
sinkt. Im Vergleich zu den Kreditgenossenschaften sind diese Ergebnisse deutlich weniger
signikant. Zusammenfassend nden wir empirische Anhaltspunkte daf ur, dass zumin-
dest eine gr oere Anzahl von Kreditinstituten es schaen, das h ohere Sektorkonzentra-
tionsrisiko aus einer spezialisierten Kreditvergabestrategie durch die damit verbundenen
Monitoring-Vorteile mehr als auszugleichen.
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3Do specialization benets outweigh concentration risks in
credit portfolios of German banks?1
1 Introduction
Two important drivers of credit risk in bank lending are the banks' screening and moni-
toring abilities and their credit concentrations in industry sectors. These risk drivers have
opposing eects on portfolio risk: Whereas better screening and monitoring abilities ceteris
paribus reduce risk, it is ceteris paribus increased by sectoral concentrations. To achieve
superior screening and monitoring abilities, a bank might specialize on certain industries in
lending and hereby raise its sectoral concentration. This means a specialized bank might
reduce its credit risk by a better monitoring quality, but, at the same time, increase its
credit risk by a higher concentration. This paper sets out to explore empirically, rst,
the impact of industry specialization on banks' screening and monitoring abilities and,
second, which of the eects prevails in the net impact on the credit risk of the portfolio.
The sample of banks comprises savings banks and cooperative banks in Germany. Both
groups of banks are particularly suited for the purpose of the paper: Their proximity to
their client base should help to reap monitoring benets, while their geographical lending
constraints may lead to sectoral concentrations.
The hypothesis of client-focused banks having superior screening and monitoring abilities
is based on their comparative advantage in overcoming information asymmetries between
bank and borrower due to the proximity to their client base.2 A deeper understanding of
the borrower's business might have the following implications:3
1For helpful comments on this and earlier versions of this paper, we are indebted to Christoph Memmel
as well as to participants of the Finance Research Seminar in Muenster, the 15th Annual Meeting of
the German Finance Association in Muenster, the 66th Annual Meeting of the Association of University
Professors of Management in Berlin, the 11th Symposium on Finance, Banking, and Insurance in Karlsruhe,
and the 1st Rostock Conference on Services Research.
2A survey of nancial intermediation may be found in Freixas and Rochet (2008), Greenbaum and
Thakor (2007), and Allen and Santomero (1998).
3Banks which practice relationship lending might also reduce information asymmetries. The empir-
ical results by Degryse and Ongena (2003) for the Norwegian bank market suggest a linkage between
diversication and relationship lending and conrm the theoretical analysis by Boot and Schmeits (2000).
However, for the German bank market the appropriate investigations are lacking. We do not examine the
1 Better screening abilities reduce the problem of adverse selection4 and allow a better
assessment of the collateral value.
 Specialized banks can detect a deterioration of the borrower's business earlier and
may react in a timely manner by risk mitigation, for example, by requesting addi-
tional collateral (monitoring in a narrow sense).5
 Specialized banks are more successful in workout processes.6
Both screening and monitoring inuence the probability of default (PD) and the loss given
default (LGD) of the borrowers in the bank's portfolio. Superior industry knowledge may
also entail a more ecient workout process and, hence, higher recovery rates. As we cannot
clearly dierentiate between screening and monitoring abilities in our empirical analysis
and as we also assume a strong positive correlation between them, the term "monitoring\
refers in this paper to both aspects.
Previous empirical work suggests that specialization entails a higher monitoring quality.
The work by Acharya et al. (2006), Kamp (2006), and Hayden et al. (2007) provides
empirical evidence that specialization on certain industries is accompanied by lower loan
loss rates. Furthermore, Acharya et al. (2006), Kamp (2006), and Craigwell et al. (2006)
reveal empirically that lending to industries serviced by a bank for the rst time is linked
to higher loan loss rates. Both results can be seen as an indication of superior monitoring
abilities of specialized banks although they may be inuenced by a tendency of specialized
banks to focus their lending on low-risk industries. This tendency seems reasonable as
banks seeking for a diversied loan portfolio in order to protect themselves against high
unexpected losses are more willing to lend to risky industries.7
In contrast to monitoring abilities, credit concentrations in industrial sectors or in single
borrowers ceteris paribus increase portfolio risk. Higher sectoral concentrations increase
default correlations in the portfolio because borrowers' default events are generally more
possible relation between relationship lending and specialization as we do not use single borrower data in
our investigations.
4See, for example, Akerlof (1970) and Hauswald and Marquez (2006).
5Better monitoring might prevent risk-shifting by borrowers. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
6Franks et al. (2004) and Grunert and Volk (2005) show that a deeper relationship between bank and
customer goes along with a higher recovery rate, possibly because of a faster workout process.
7Empirical evidence for this relation in the case of cooperative banks may be found in B ove and Pngsten
(2008).
2correlated if they are in the same sector than if they are in dierent sectors. Therefore,
regulators demand that this risk needs to be considered in banks' risk management.8
D ullmann and Masschelein (2007) conrm in an empirical analysis that the impact of
sectoral concentrations is substantial in real banks' credit portfolios. Whereas monitoring
abilities are commonly measured by prots and average losses, i.e. in the middle of the
loss distribution, risk concentrations only become relevant in its adverse tail, i.e. for rare
events.
Rossi et al. (2009) nd that a higher sectoral diversication reduces realized risk mea-
sured by the amount of provisions for bad loans. While this result is subject to the
critique that concentration materializes only in the tail of a loss distribution, they also
nd that an increase in diversication reduces the amount of capital actually required by
managers. Summarizing they nd support for the classical diversication hypothesis that
risk-adjusted returns are higher for well-diversied portfolios. They do not dierentiate
banks, however, with respect to their monitoring benets obtained from specialization.
Empirical work that addresses the net eect of superior monitoring abilities of specialized
banks and the associated sectoral concentrations on the credit risk of a loan portfolio is
missing. Only the theoretical work by Winton (1999) includes monitoring incentives and
recommends diversication strategies solely for banks with medium high portfolio risk. In
order to close this gap, we examine in this paper whether the positive relationship between
specialization level in corporate lending and portfolio risk still holds if the assumption of
a constant monitoring quality is abandoned and dierent degrees of monitoring quality
depending on the specialization level are considered. In order to conduct this analysis,
we have chosen a two-stage procedure. In the rst part, we examine the relation between
specialization level and monitoring quality. The results of this empirical analysis are
used as input parameters for the second analysis, which claries the relation between
specialization level and portfolio risk.
Our empirical analysis is based on annual bank proprietary data from 1995 to 2006 and
comprises the primary institutions of German savings and cooperative banks. The mea-
surement of the specialization level uses the borrower statistic, which includes the loan
exposures of each German bank in corporate banking broken down into 23 industry sectors.
8See Bundesanstalt f ur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (2009), BTR 1.1, and Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2006).
3The main results of the paper are: Specialized banks show, on average, a higher moni-
toring quality than diversied banks. This relationship is stronger for cooperative banks
than for savings banks in Germany. Incorporating these specialization benets into the
examination of portfolio risk, we nd a negative relationship between specialization level
and portfolio risk in the case of the cooperative banks, i.e. the specialization benets over-
compensate the negative concentration eects. For savings banks, we have to dierentiate
between the results for naive specialization measures and distance measures. Specializa-
tion measured by Hirschman Herndahl indices is accompanied by a higher portfolio risk,
whereas specialization measured by distance measures is accompanied by a lower portfolio
risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we examine the rela-
tionship between specialization level and monitoring quality. After the introduction of
our main variables (section 2.1), the empirical design (section 2.2), and our data sources
(section 2.3), we present and interpret the empirical results (section 2.4.1), and check
for robustness (section 2.4.2). In section 3, we examine the relationship between spe-
cialization level and portfolio risk. Firstly, we introduce the applied credit model. After
the description of the calibration and the empirical design, we present and interpret the
results. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
2 Measurement of specialization benets
2.1 Key Variables
2.1.1 Measurement of the specialization level
In order to measure monitoring benets of specialized banks, we revert to the specializa-
tion measures used by Kamp (2006). For measuring naive diversication the Hirschman
Herndahl Index (HHI) is a very popular key index.9 In our case it is calculated for bank
b at time t as
9In addition to the HHI there are further concentration measures, for example the Gini-coecient and






where x(b;i;t) stands for the proportion of industry i as a share of the corporate loans of
bank b at time t. The HHI values range from 1
23 for the most diversied (equal shares in
all 23 sectors) to 1 for the most concentrated (single sector) portfolio.
In addition to the calculation of the HHI based on loan volumes we evaluate a weighted









j=1 IR(j;t)  X(b;j;t)
!2
; (2)
where X(b;i;t) denotes the loan amount of bank b in industry i at time t and IR(i;t) denotes
the insolvency rate of industry i at time t in Germany. This denition takes into account
that the level of knowledge and eort exerted for monitoring should reect the level of po-
tential loss. The higher the risk, the more endeavours there are to monitor. If an industry
constitutes a major part of the risk weighted loan exposure, this should be reected in the
specialization level.10
The HHI (HHIw) has been criticized as a specialization measure because of its equal
weighting of the industries although the industries dier greatly in loan volume and im-
portance for the lending business. In particular, the explanatory power of the HHI depends
on the chosen industry classication. Hence, Pngsten and Rudolph (2004) recommend
distance measures to benchmark portfolios as reasonable alternative key gures. These
measures have already been used in papers by Kamp (2006) and Norden and Szerencses
(2005). Our benchmarks are the national lending composition by industry (nation) and
the regional lending compositions (region) by industry.11 Each bank b is assigned to one
region.12 Since the investigation focuses on savings banks and cooperative banks, the re-
10We revert to the insolvency rates of the industries because of a lack of single borrower data.
11For the motivation of the benchmarks, see Kamp (2006). For the calculation of the regional bench-
marks, we use the same banks as mentioned in footnote 13.
12The banks are assigned to 182 dierent regions in total. According to K otter and Wedow (2006), local
savings and cooperative banks grant, on average, 80% of their loan portfolio to customers within these
regions.




(i;t) , respectively, as the sums of the loan amounts in the industry i
at time t at the national level and the level of the region, respectively, where the head oce
of bank b is located.13 x
(;) indicates the corresponding proportions. We adopt the stan-
dardized sum of the absolute dierences between the bank portfolio and the benchmark











where type = nation or region. The values range from 0 to 1 and can be interpreted as
the part of the loan portfolio which has to be rearranged to replicate the structure of the
benchmark portfolio.
In the case of all specialization measures, high values imply a high level of specialization
and low values indicate a high level of diversication. We stress that a high level of
specialization is not necessarily a result of the bank's strategy. In fact, this does not
impair our investigations. Table 1 gives an overview of the specialization levels for savings
banks and cooperative banks.
Table 1: Summary statistics of specialization measures
This table presents summary statistics of specialization measures based on average values
per bank for the time period 1995-2006.
savings banks cooperative banks
mean median 5% quantile 95% quantile mean median 5% quantile 95% quantile
HHI 0.107 0.105 0.084 0.135 0.143 0.123 0.091 0.265
HHIw 0.127 0.122 0.096 0.174 0.163 0.148 0.107 0.258
Dnation 0.294 0.288 0.204 0.407 0.432 0.419 0.288 0.619
Dregion 0.202 0.190 0.099 0.345 0.321 0.306 0.164 0.549
Obviously, savings banks are more diversied than cooperative banks. For each specia-
lization measure, the mean values of the cooperative banks are about 1:5 times higher
than the mean values of the savings banks. It is also noteworthy that the 95th percentiles
of the savings banks are about as high as the means of the cooperative banks.
13For the calculation of X
regionb
(i;t) we merely include cooperative, savings, and regional banks.
14The benchmarks based on the regional lending dier depending on the region to which a bank belongs.
Because of this, the benchmark carries the index b.
6As the business of cooperative banks and savings banks is mostly regionally constrained,
deviations from the national benchmark may stem from deviations of the corresponding
regional industry composition from the national benchmark. To analyze the impact of










2.1.2 Measurement of the monitoring quality
In order to examine the relationship between specialization level and monitoring quality,
we need to dene a proxy for the monitoring quality. The proxy consists of two compo-
nents, the expected and the actual (loan) loss rates, which we introduce now. The term
expected loss rate refers to the loss rate given default, but for the unconditional loss rate,
which depends on the probability of default (PD) and the LGD. In order to determine
the expected losses, we use the borrower statistics and the insolvency statistics. Strictly
speaking, we calculate the losses (EL) and the loss rates (ELR), respectively, which can




X(b;i;t)  IR(i;t)  f
stateb
t (5)
as the expected losses of bank b at time t, where f
stateb
t is an adjustment factor for the
state in which bank b operates. It is calculated as the ratio of the average insolvency rate
in the corresponding state at time t to the average insolvency rate in Germany at time t.
This renement seems to be reasonable as savings and cooperative banks have a regional
business district. Because of a lack of information the LGD is assumed as 45%.15 We shall
correct for inaccuracies due to this rough assumption later.16 The expected loss rate of the
corporate loans (ELR) is computed as the ratio of the expected loss to the total corporate
loan amount. The term expected loss rate has to be used carefully. As the industry is
considered as the key risk factor for the PD and the insolvency rates indicate the defaulted
proportion of each industry, ELR is a reasonable measure of the loss rate which a bank
15The expected loss of each industry is therefore calculated as 0.45EADPD, where EAD corresponds
to the loan amount and the PD corresponds to the insolvency rate.
16According to Grossman et al. (1997), Bartlett (2000), and Kabance (2001), the industry aliation has
an inuence on the recovery rate.
7with corresponding industry allocation should show on average. We interpret the ex post
knowledge of the insolvency rate of an industry as the ex ante expected default rate of an
industry, i. e. in so far perfect prediction is assumed.
To approximate the actual loss rates which will be related to the expected loss rates we
use the following two proxies:17
 Rate of distressed loans (LRdis)18:=
Nominal amount of audited distressed loans
Loan amount
(6)
 Failure rate (LRfai):=
(Consumption of specic loan provisions + Net direct write-os on loans)
Loan amount
(7)
The rate of distressed loans LRdis does not consider the loss rate given default unlike
LRfai. This is advantageous for our analysis because results based on this variable are
robust against any assumption about the LGD. It is, however, based on stock variables
and a distressed loan is considered several times. Furthermore, LRdis heavily depends on
the point in time a loan is designated as a distressed loan.
The failure rate LRfai has a numerator which is a ow variable and it refers to loan losses
which   in contrast to LRdis   are quite certain. It is used by many banks in their annual
reports to reveal the actual losses.19










This means that MON dis
(b;t) denotes the ratio of LRdis to the expected loss rate and MON
fai
(b;t)
denotes the ratio of LRfai to the expected loss rate for bank b at time t. A comparatively
17In order to simplify the notation, we do not display subscripts for time and bank.
18The audited distressed loans comprise specic doubtful loans and loans with increased latent risk.
An alternative would be to use the audited loans as the denominator. However, the risk-orientated audit
implies that the portfolio of audited loans particularly contains the critical loan engagements.
19Further reasonable variables used in additional examinations are the appropriation rate (ratio of net
loan loss provisions appropriation to net write-os over loan amount) or the loan loss provisions ratio.
However, for both variables the same critical points as for the used proxies are valid.
8low value of MON implies that a bank selects and monitors borrowers in their customer
industries in a comparatively better way. Therefore, MON is used as a proxy for the
monitoring quality of a bank. The lower MON, the higher the monitoring quality is.20
2.2 Empirical design
The analysis of the relationship between specialization level and monitoring quality is
based on the following linear regression model:
log(MON)b =  + 1  SMb + 2  loanb + 3  retailb + 4  local authorityb
+5  mortgageb + +6  unsecuredb + 7  personnelb (9)
+8  marketb + 9  sizeb + 10  agglom1b + 11  agglom2b
+12  eastb + 13  merge1b + 14  merge2b + b;
where the variables represent average values over the observed time period (basically,
1995 to 2006) for each bank. SM stands for the four specialization measures introduced
in section 2.1.1 and MON is short for MON dis and MON fai. The main idea of this
investigation is to evaluate the relationship between the specialization level and the ratio
(MON) of actual and expected loss rates. This ratio reects the relation between the
actual loan losses and the losses, which are expected based on the industry allocation in
corporate lending. The higher MON is, the worse is the implied monitoring ability of
a bank. We use the natural logarithm of the quotient as relative   and not absolute  
variations of MON are considered.21
The main reason for reducing the panel structure to a pure cross-sectional data structure
by averaging for each bank is the objective to use a reasonable and reliable actual loan
loss rate. Forming provisions for specic doubtful loans does not usually coincide with
the insolvency of a borrower, but it already signals that a timely redemption of interest
and amortization payments has become doubtful. Direct write-os and the consumption
of provisions are normally conducted at a later date, when the default is certain. Since
20We assume that there is no systematic dierence between the risk preference of specialized and diversi-
ed banks. Investigations concerning the interest rates in lending conrm this assumption. Corresponding
results will be provided by the authors on request.
21This means that, for example, a bisection of MON is always connected with the same improvement
of the monitoring quality not depending on the level of MON. To ease reading, we keep the term MON
instead of log(MON) below.
9the practices dier enormously between banks and banks have intertemporal leeway, it
seems to be useful to refer to a longer time period than just one year for the calculation
of a reasonable loss variable. These aspects cannot be considered by a panel analysis,
for example, a xed-eects estimation with time lags. Additionally, we prefer to examine
the dierences between banks rather than dierent SM values within a bank over time as
about 90% (80%) of the whole SM variance of cooperative (savings) banks is explained
by variation of the average SM values between banks and just 10% (20%) stems from
SM variation over time. The between groups estimation also gives us the opportunity to
integrate time xed variables into the equation, for instance, for being located in former
west German or east German territory.
In particular because of the error term correction, we use the number of observed years
for each bank as a weighting factor in the regression. Additionally, we conduct a White
adjustment for the standard errors. We also perform Ramsey tests to examine whether
omitted variables or endogeneities may cause problems and calculate variance ination
factors to check for multi-collinearity. Regressions with modied variable compositions
are also conducted. In the case of mergers, we identify the merged bank with the bigger
bank or the bank that has taken over another bank. The smaller bank or bank that has
been taken over is considered as an independent observation entity until the year of the
merger.22 We exclude banks with less than seven years of observations from the data set
as we want to calculate a reliable proxy for the monitoring quality. Incorporating retail
banks with just a few corporate loans would provoke biased results if the aim is to examine
corporate lending business. Therefore, we exclude banks with a retail share of more than
90%. Furthermore, we perform various robustness checks, which are presented in section
2.4.2.
The main hypothesis is that specialization improves the monitoring quality, which implies
1 < 0. A negative 1 means that specialized banks have, on average, lower actual losses
relative to their expected losses than diversied banks. This would mean that specialized
banks show monitoring advantages, i.e. superior screening abilities to identify better
borrowers in an industry or superior monitoring abilities to inuence an ongoing contract
positively, which leads to comparatively low losses from lending. This conclusion would be
22There are alternative ways of merger treatments, for example, the merged bank is treated as a new
entity. Additional examinations have shown no major impact of dierent merger treatments on the results.
10valid because we do not rely solely on loan loss rates, but adjust for each bank's industry
allocation. In the case of the MONdis and in contrast to the MONfai, the inuence
of dierent LGD values is omitted so that the examination just considers dierent PD
values.
Additionally, further variables which might inuence the monitoring quality and the loan
losses, respectively, are considered.23 The share of loans (loan) might have an impact, as,
for a bank with a high loan share, the relevance of lending could induce a more diligent
monitoring activity, or a deeper industry knowledge is achieved. In contrast to this, a
higher loan share could also be related to riskier lending which aspires to maintain the
high loan share. This means both negative and positive signs could be explained for the
coecient. As the actual loss rate is calculated solely on the basis of the corporate loans,
it is implicitly assumed that the loss rate in retail lending equals the loss rate in corporate
lending. In order to control for dierences, we consider the share of retail loans (retail).
It might also be plausible that banks with a high retail share pursue safe engagements in
corporate lending which merely represents an extension of their credit portfolio. Negative
coecients are expected for the share of local authority loans (local authority) and the
share of mortgage loans (mortgage) as we could assume a loss rate of 0% for local authority
loans24 and relatively low loss rates for mortgage loans (due to specics of the German
mortgage market).25 We revert to the unsecured portion in the case of audited specic
doubtful loans (unsecured) in order to reect dierent LGDs across banks26 and to mitigate
the problem of lacking LGD data for industries. The higher unsecured, the higher should be
MONfai. As MONdis does not depend on the LGD, a signicantly positive relation between
unsecured and MONdis would be a surprise.27 The proxy for personnel expenses assigned
to corporate lending (personnel) is used as a proxy for monitoring eorts by Coleman
et al. (2006). Thus, we expect that a higher personnel value is accompanied by lower
MON values.28 A higher market share (market) of a bank in its business district could
23The exact denitions of the control variables are given in the appendices (section 5.1).
24See Lux (2001).
25See Eichwald and Pehle (2000).
26See, for example, Grunert and Weber (2007) for the strong dependency between collateralization and
LGD.
27We remark that the incorporation of the variable unsecured counteracts the possibly prevalent eect
of specialization on the LGD.
28A detailed description of the estimation of the variable personnel is given in the appendices (section
5.1).
11imply higher bargaining power, which could positively aect the selection of borrowers
or the request of collaterals. However, a larger market share could also be the result of
an undierentiated lending policy and market power could also be used to charge higher
interest rates instead of reducing the risk. We consider the natural logarithm of total
assets (size) as a proxy for the size of a bank. We expect that bigger banks have lower
MON values. Bigger banks can build up deeper industry knowledge more easily than other
banks (given a xed specialization level) because they can allocate the xed costs related
to monitoring activities over a larger volume. Bigger banks, however, are more prone to
a bloated organization and communication decits.29 This argument suggests a positive
relationship between MON and size. To control for regional specics, we assign degrees of
agglomeration to the business districts. Based on the information of the Bundesamt f ur
Bauwesen und Raumordnung, we dierentiate between an urban agglomeration, an urban
area, and a rural area. We introduce the two dummy variables agglom1 and agglom2 where
agglom1=1 if and only if the business district is an urban agglomeration and agglom2=1
if and only if the business district is an urban area.30 Additionally, we use the dummy
variable east to indicate whether the business district belongs to eastern Germany (east=1)
or to western Germany (east=0). East German banks might face a dierent business
condition. As mergers could have an eect on banks' business, we introduce the two
dummy variables merge1 and merge2, where merge1=1 if and only if the bank has taken
over another bank during the observation period and merge2=1 if and only if the bank has
been taken over during the observation period. Banks that have been taken over might
postpone write-os in credit business in order to euphemize their economic condition. As
audits should be independent, we assume a negative relation merely for MONfai and not
for MONdis with merge2. Banks which have taken over another bank might have to make
up for the risk provisioning implying a positive coecient for merge1 in case of MONfai.
Table 11 in the appendices (section 5.2) shows some summary statistics of the introduced
variables, and correlations between the variables are given in Tables 12 to 14 of section
5.3.
We run our regressions for savings banks and cooperative banks separately and also per-
form the joint regression
29See Tr oger (2003) and Cerasi and Daltung (2000).
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in order to clarify whether there are signicant dierences between savings banks and
cooperative banks concerning the inuence of the specialization level on the monitoring
quality. The dummy variable savingsb takes the value 1 if the bank is a savings bank
and the value 0 if the bank is a cooperative bank. z(i;b) for j = 2;:::;14 stands for the
explanatory variables used in equation 9.
2.3 Data
As mentioned above, we restrict our analysis to savings banks and the primary institutions
of the category of cooperative banks. These banks are predominantly engaged in tradi-
tional lending business and show the highest level of homogeneity among themselves.31
Furthermore, data constraints, as can be seen below, are not problematic for these banks,
which have regional business districts in most cases. Savings banks and cooperative banks
constituted 84% (89%) of all German banks in 2006 (1995), their share of aggregated total
assets was 24% on average during the period from 1995 to 2006, and their share of domestic
loans was 35% on average. From 1995 to 2006, the number of cooperative banks (savings
banks) fell   mainly due to mergers   from 2,589 (624) to 1,255 (457). Our analysis is
based on annual data from 1995 until 2006, i.e. the investigation period is 12 years. All in
all, 80% (90%) of the cooperative banks (savings banks) are, on average, included in the
standard data set per year.32
In the quarter-annual German borrower statistics, Deutsche Bundesbank records the loan
exposures of each German bank in corporate banking dierentiated by 23 industries. The
classication resembles the industry classication of the Federal Statistical Oce and
the NACE Code, respectively. Foreign loans are not considered, nor are o-balance-sheet
credit transactions and credit derivatives. The impact of these restrictions, however, should
be rather low as we restrain on the primary institutions of the cooperative sector and on
31See Hackethal (2004).
32As mentioned in the previous section, we exclude retail banks and banks with less than seven years of
data.
13savings banks, which are generally not active players in these business segments. Amongst
others, these data are fundamental for the calculation of the specialization level.
The second relevant data source is the Bankaufsichtliches Informationssystem (BAKIS).
The data which is collected by Deutsche Bundesbank and the German Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority (BaFin) includes annual balance sheet, prot and loss data of all
German banks, and annual quantitative reports by auditors. Amongst others, we use these
data to approximate the actual loan losses.
For the calculation of the expected loan losses, we also resort to the Federal Statistical
Oce's statistics on insolvencies and numbers of rms liable to sales taxes. The classi-
cation by industry is at least as detailed as the one in the borrower statistics. This allows
mapping among the 23 industries. The insolvency ratio in each industry is calculated as




In this section, we present the results of the regressions which will clarify whether spe-
cialized banks have a lower ratio of actual to expected loss rates than diversied banks.
Table 2 contains the results for the cooperative banks, Table 3 contains the results for the
savings banks. In Table 4 we present the results of the joint regressions run for both bank-
ing groups for completeness. Since most banks in the sample belong to the cooperative
banking category, the results of the joint regressions are closely related to the results of
the separate regressions for cooperative banks. Therefore, we focus in our analysis on the
regressions for the two separate groups rather than on the joint regressions.
The variables have been      standardized to possess mean zero and unit variance. In
all cases, the heteroscedasticity-robust F-tests indicate the statistical signicance of the
regressions. Concerning the Ramsey tests, the hypothesis is rejected at least for the 5%-
(10%-)level in the case of the cooperative banks (savings banks). The variance ination
33Although there are inaccuracies for certain industries, for example, agriculture and forestry, the lack
of an exhaustive German business register means that using the number of rms liable to sales taxes is a
common way of approximating the number of companies in Germany.
14factors for the separated regressions are all below 5 and, on average, below 2, signalling
no distortion of our results due to near multi-collinearity.
15Table 2: Regression results on specialization benets of cooperative banks
This table presents results of the regressions with MON
fai and MON
dis, respectively, as the




 indicate statistical signicance at a 0:1%, 1%, 5% signicance level.
The values in brackets are the corresponding t-values.
MONfai MONdis
HHI HHIw Dnation Dregion HHI HHIw Dnation Dregion
SM -0.229*** -0.204*** -0.301*** -0.183*** -0.141*** -0.196*** -0.204*** -0.126***
(-5.43) (-5.76) (-6.65) (-5.13) (-3.32) (-5.21) (-4.30) (-3.45)
loan 0.122*** 0.143*** 0.102** 0.139*** 0.205*** 0.207*** 0.187*** 0.212***
(3.98) (4.74) (3.18) (4.51) (5.18) (5.43) (4.70) (5.54)
retail -0.167*** -0.128*** -0.134*** -0.118*** -0.153*** -0.137*** -0.134*** -0.124***
(-5.31) (-4.33) (-4.63) (-4.13) (-4.36) (-4.20) (-4.09) (-3.81)
local authority -0.056 -0.058 -0.050 -0.066* -0.065* -0.049 -0.058 -0.068*
(-1.76) (-1.92) (-1.49) (-1.97) (-2.07) (-1.71) (-1.75) (-2.07)
mortgage -0.111*** -0.099*** -0.109*** -0.104*** -0.099*** -0.090*** -0.098*** -0.094***
(-3.90) (-3.38) (-3.82) (-3.52) (-3.58) (-3.30) (-3.55) (-3.39)
unsecured 0.192*** 0.179*** 0.187*** 0.186*** -0.004 -0.013 -0.006 -0.007
(4.88) (4.50) (4.80) (4.66) (-0.10) (-0.33) (-0.17) (-0.19)
personnel -0.061 -0.068 -0.055 -0.045 -0.095** -0.111*** -0.093** -0.086**
(-1.78) (-1.93) (-1.57) (-1.25) (-2.92) (-3.45) (-2.81) (-2.60)
market -0.024 -0.027 -0.019 -0.082** -0.023 -0.017 -0.018 -0.061*
(-1.14) (-1.28) (-0.92) (-3.20) (-0.91) (-0.74) (-0.73) (-2.00)
size 0.174*** 0.207*** 0.060 0.165*** 0.023 0.026 -0.060 0.010
(4.81) (5.94) (1.33) (4.14) (0.54) (0.68) (-1.19) (0.23)
agglom1 -0.027 -0.008 -0.072* -0.015 -0.046 -0.027 -0.077* -0.038
(-0.90) (-0.25) (-2.30) (-0.51) (-1.44) (-0.82) (-2.35) (-1.17)
agglom2 0.005 0.010 -0.014 -0.010 0.038 0.043 0.025 0.027
(0.16) (0.34) (-0.48) (-0.34) (1.27) (1.47) (0.83) (0.93)
east 0.084** 0.132*** 0.093*** 0.107*** -0.053 -0.029 -0.051 -0.042
(3.23) (5.28) (3.54) (4.11) (-1.67) (-0.99) (-1.63) (-1.37)
merge1 0.112*** 0.106*** 0.119*** 0.115*** 0.051 0.041 0.055 0.052
(4.50) (4.24) (4.78) (4.47) (1.68) (1.37) (1.82) (1.68)
merge2 -0.055* -0.038 -0.058* -0.050* 0.016 0.030 0.014 0.019
(-2.45) (-1.65) (-2.56) (-2.19) (0.68) (1.28) (0.58) (0.79)
observations 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575
R2 0.277 0.273 0.280 0.260 0.129 0.144 0.133 0.124
16Table 3: Regression results on specialization benets of savings banks
This table presents results of the regressions with MON
fai and MON
dis, respectively, as the




 indicate statistical signicance at a 0:1%, 1%, 5% signicance level.
The values in brackets are the corresponding t-values.
MONfai MONdis
HHI HHIw Dnation Dregion HHI HHIw Dnation Dregion
SM -0.034 -0.190*** -0.216*** -0.038 -0.010 -0.119* -0.132* -0.036
(-0.68) (-3.93) (-4.08) (-1.00) (-0.22) (-2.46) (-2.27) (-0.84)
loan 0.022 -0.005 -0.027 0.022 -0.025 -0.042 -0.055 -0.025
(0.35) (-0.07) (-0.42) (0.35) (-0.36) (-0.61) (-0.78) (-0.36)
retail -0.142** -0.138** -0.138** -0.142** -0.262*** -0.260*** -0.260*** -0.264***
(-2.98) (-2.94) (-2.97) (-2.97) (-5.42) (-5.45) (-5.47) (-5.52)
local authority -0.067 -0.083* -0.079 -0.066 -0.046 -0.056 -0.053 -0.045
(-1.58) (-2.00) (-1.81) (-1.56) (-1.02) (-1.24) (-1.14) (-0.99)
mortgage -0.121** -0.104* -0.138** -0.122** -0.270*** -0.258*** -0.279*** -0.269***
(-2.76) (-2.41) (-3.23) (-2.79) (-5.22) (-5.02) (-5.50) (-5.23)
unsecured 0.339*** 0.321*** 0.333*** 0.339*** 0.102 0.091 0.098 0.102
(6.82) (6.42) (6.69) (6.82) (1.90) (1.68) (1.82) (1.90)
personnel 0.145** 0.128* 0.141** 0.144** 0.023 0.011 0.019 0.020
(2.75) (2.41) (2.67) (2.69) (0.37) (0.18) (0.31) (0.32)
market -0.064 -0.057 -0.064 -0.081 -0.048 -0.043 -0.047 -0.063
(-1.46) (-1.36) (-1.52) (-1.78) (-0.97) (-0.89) (-0.97) (-1.23)
size 0.234*** 0.161** 0.095 0.236*** -0.158* -0.207** -0.246*** -0.164*
(4.03) (2.68) (1.43) (4.06) (-2.41) (-3.09) (-3.38) (-2.58)
agglom1 -0.084 -0.068 -0.127* -0.087 -0.006 0.006 -0.030 -0.005
(-1.42) (-1.17) (-2.18) (-1.47) (-0.10) (0.10) (-0.50) (-0.08)
agglom2 0.041 0.046 0.029 0.040 0.163** 0.165** 0.155** 0.161**
(0.79) (0.88) (0.55) (0.76) (2.94) (2.98) (2.82) (2.91)
east 0.235** 0.277*** 0.172* 0.223** -0.069 -0.041 -0.106 -0.077
(3.02) (3.60) (2.18) (2.85) (-0.85) (-0.51) (-1.31) (-0.96)
merge1 -0.005 0.009 -0.002 -0.004 -0.050 -0.043 -0.050 -0.052
(-0.11) (0.22) (-0.06) (-0.11) (-1.08) (-0.93) (-1.09) (-1.13)
merge2 0.001 0.017 -0.007 0.002 0.015 0.025 0.010 0.016
(0.03) (0.44) (-0.18) (0.06) (0.38) (0.64) (0.25) (0.42)
observations 534 534 534 534 534 534 534 534
R2 0.316 0.337 0.338 0.316 0.195 0.204 0.204 0.196
17Table 4: Regression results on specialization benets of a pooled sample of
cooperative banks and savings banks
This table presents results of the regressions with MON
fai and MON
dis, respectively, as the




 indicate statistical signicance at a 0:1%, 1%, 5% signicance level.
The values in brackets are the corresponding t-values.
MONfai MONdis
HHI HHIw Dnation Dregion HHI HHIw Dnation Dregion
SM -0.237*** -0.216*** -0.379*** -0.215*** -0.162*** -0.207*** -0.279*** -0.159***
(-6.23) (-6.56) (-8.11) (-6.11) (-4.40) (-6.29) (-5.84) (-4.63)
SMsavings 2.701 -0.024 0.203** 0.115** 1.859 0.059 0.192* 0.064
(1.53) (-0.33) (2.89) (3.02) (1.44) (0.66) (2.19) (1.39)
loan 0.121*** 0.143*** 0.093** 0.139*** 0.171*** 0.176*** 0.148*** 0.182***
(4.19) (5.03) (3.10) (4.85) (4.98) (5.30) (4.23) (5.49)
retail -0.174*** -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.124*** -0.169*** -0.154*** -0.148*** -0.136***
(-6.53) (-5.53) (-5.70) (-5.01) (-6.01) (-5.77) (-5.52) (-5.13)
local authority -0.050 -0.053* -0.053 -0.058* -0.032 -0.024 -0.032 -0.036
(-1.88) (-2.10) (-1.93) (-2.08) (-1.20) (-0.95) (-1.15) (-1.26)
mortgage -0.115*** -0.098*** -0.121*** -0.109*** -0.108*** -0.097*** -0.113*** -0.103***
(-4.37) (-3.62) (-4.59) (-4.00) (-4.47) (-4.02) (-4.65) (-4.22)
unsecured 0.210*** 0.195*** 0.205*** 0.208*** 0.023 0.012 0.021 0.022
(6.08) (5.54) (5.96) (5.93) (0.76) (0.37) (0.67) (0.69)
personnel -0.036 -0.043 -0.029 -0.021 -0.094*** -0.108*** -0.091** -0.085**
(-1.17) (-1.37) (-0.93) (-0.64) (-3.38) (-3.92) (-3.21) (-2.96)
market -0.037* -0.043* -0.030 -0.084*** -0.025 -0.024 -0.017 -0.062*
(-2.00) (-2.36) (-1.61) (-3.81) (-1.11) (-1.10) (-0.76) (-2.38)
size 0.220*** 0.248*** 0.074 0.211*** -0.010 -0.007 -0.120* -0.026
(5.94) (6.67) (1.63) (5.28) (-0.25) (-0.18) (-2.35) (-0.59)
agglom1 -0.032 -0.011 -0.076** -0.023 -0.034 -0.014 -0.066* -0.026
(-1.21) (-0.43) (-2.79) (-0.87) (-1.25) (-0.53) (-2.39) (-0.96)
agglom2 0.018 0.025 -0.000 0.004 0.070** 0.077** 0.057* 0.059*
(0.69) (0.96) (-0.01) (0.14) (2.77) (3.03) (2.23) (2.33)
east 0.109*** 0.165*** 0.104*** 0.134*** -0.055 -0.026 -0.061* -0.040
(3.97) (6.17) (3.77) (4.85) (-1.82) (-0.92) (-2.04) (-1.34)
merge1 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.037 0.028 0.037 0.037
(4.41) (4.27) (4.50) (4.38) (1.50) (1.16) (1.51) (1.49)
merge2 -0.049* -0.030 -0.054** -0.045* 0.017 0.031 0.013 0.019
(-2.48) (-1.52) (-2.73) (-2.27) (0.84) (1.57) (0.64) (0.97)
savings -0.180 -0.035 -0.288*** -0.154** -0.364*** -0.306** -0.450*** -0.287***
(-1.82) (-0.43) (-3.41) (-3.00) (-3.41) (-3.10) (-4.43) (-4.81)
observations 2109 2109 2109 2109 2109 2109 2109 2109
R2 0.278 0.274 0.284 0.260 0.188 0.201 0.194 0.181
We shall concentrate on the main results, which refer to the relation between specialization
level and monitoring quality. Both for cooperative banks and savings banks, negative co-
ecients 1 are prevalent for both loss rates. Furthermore, the coecients are negative for
18the joint estimations. In the case of the cooperative banks, statistically and economically
signicant negative relationships between the specialization level and the ratio of actual
loss rate over expected loss rate can be observed. In all cases, there is statistical signi-
cance at the 0.1% level. This means that specialized cooperative banks, on average, show
a higher monitoring quality than other cooperative banks. The strongest negative relation
can be detected in the case of the distance measure Dnation, but the dierences between the
results for dierent specialization measures are rather low. Naive specialization measures
as well as distance measures seem to be appropriate for capturing specialization benets
in lending. Using MONdis or MONfai as a proxy for monitoring quality does not make a
big dierence. We notice a slightly stronger relation in the case of MONfai. Compared
to the cooperative banks, the relationship is somewhat weaker for the savings banks, as
is indicated by the positive coecients for the interaction term in Table 4.34 We observe
statistically signicant negative relations between the specialization level and the proxies
for monitoring quality in four out of eight cases. The dierences between the results for
the specialization measures are quite large. For HHIw and Dnation we can state statistical
signicance in contrast to the measures HHI and Dregion with insignicant relations. The
discrepancy between the results for HHI and HHIw might indicate that savings banks
gear their monitoring eorts more to the related risk than to the volume of a loan expo-
sure. Thus, higher HHIw values would tend to suggest deeper industry knowledge than
higher HHI values in the case of the savings banks. The results for Dnation and Dregion
indicate that deviations from regional benchmarks, which could be regarded as actively
chosen specialization, are inferior to deviations from the national benchmark, which might
be seen as passive specialization, in explaining superior monitoring abilities. However, it
should be considered that these results may also be driven by neglecting supraregional
banks within the calculation of Dregion. Furthermore, the negative relationship is stronger
for MONfai than for MONdis. As MONdis does not consider   as mentioned above   the
impact of dierent LGDs, we could conclude that the LGD, in particular, is inuenced by
the specialization level and that the eect of specializing in certain industries on the PD
is rather small. Overall, we can conclude that monitoring benets are prevalent for both
specialized cooperative banks and specialized savings banks.
34An exception has to be noted for the specialization measure HHI
w in the case of MON
fai. The results
concerning the signicance of the interaction coecients have to be interpreted carefully because, in most
cases, the corresponding variance ination factors are higher than 10.
19We shall now highlight some of the results for the control variables. A larger loan share
is accompanied by higher MON values in the case of the cooperative banks. Coopera-
tive banks with larger loan shares possibly neglect risk aspects to maintain the large loan
shares.35 There is a statistically signicant negative relationship between the retail share
and MON. This could stem from lower loss rates in retail business compared to corpo-
rate business, or banks with a larger share of retail activities might concentrate purely
on apparently low-risk borrowers in corporate lending. As assumed, we see negative re-
lationships in the case of local authority, mortgage and unsecured. A larger unsecured
portion is accompanied by a higher MONfai-value as the LGD is increasing. In the case
of the savings banks, there is slight evidence that a higher collateralization rate related to
audited specic doubtful loans, which includes subsequent collateralization, is connected
with a better monitoring quality as we can also observe negative relations for MONdis. The
results for the personnel expenses are rather heterogenous. All in all, personnel expenses
show just a marginal and not a uniform impact on MON. For savings banks, positive
relationships can be observed. Higher personnel expenses for the credit business tend  
contrary to our expectations   to worsen the monitoring quality in the case of savings
banks. Regressions which omit the specialization measure as an explanatory variable show
a slightly negative relationship for the personnel variable.36 It is obvious that the special-
ization level has higher explanatory power for the monitoring quality than the personnel
expenses in lending. The market share which species the loan share a bank possesses in
its customers' industries in relation to the whole regional lending exhibits an insignicant
negative relationship with MON. Considerations which equate a higher market share with
higher market power and conclude that there are benets for the selection of the borrow-
ers and the collateralization cannot be veried here. In addition, there is no indication
that a larger market share is the result of an unrestrained and imprudent lending policy.
We do not examine whether both eects coexist and cancel each other. Both for coop-
erative banks and savings banks, MONdis decreases and MONfai increases in the case of
increasing bank size. To some extent, we can observe that the agglomeration level of the
business district has an impact on MON. In agglomeration areas, the MON values tend to
be lower, possibly due to lower insolvency rates. MONfai values are signicantly lower in
western Germany than in eastern Germany, but MONdis values are insignicantly higher
35Negative correlations between loan share and loan growth over the observation period indicate, however,
that banks with larger loan shares do not aggressively expand their credit business.
36The results will be provided by the authors on request.
20in western Germany. This might be explained by higher LGD values in eastern Germany.
Cooperative banks that have been taken over in a merger seem to postpone loan write-os
as indicated by a negative relation between merge2 and MONfai and a positive relation
between merge2 and MONdis. Cooperative banks that have taken over have to make up
for loan loss adjustments signaled by a positive merge2-coecient if using MONfai as
proxy for monitoring quality.
2.4.2 Robustness checks
To check whether the results are robust to variations, we conduct additional regressions
based on a modied data set or a modied model. We restrict the presentation of the
results on the relationship between specialization level and monitoring quality as we are
mainly interested in the existence of specialization benets, but not on eects of control
variables.
Firstly, we check whether variations in the data base have a crucial impact on the results.
In detail, we proceed as follows:
 We exclude banks which have values lower than the 1%-quantile or above the 99%-
quantile in one of the variables. By doing so, we wish to clarify whether any results
are driven mainly by banks with extreme variable specications.
 We change the threshold for the retail share from 90% to 60%. Banks with a retail
share larger than 60% are excluded. As the 90% threshold was chosen rather arbi-
trarily, we wish to ascertain that this specic choice was not a crucial factor for the
presented results.
 We use an insolvency rate of 0% for agriculture and forestry. As the evaluation
of a correct insolvency rate in this industry is rather dicult owing to the fact
that many rms of this industry are not liable to sales taxes, we check whether
specialization benets would still be valid under an extreme assumption. Specialized
cooperative banks, in particular, are engaged in agriculture and forestry.37 Therefore,
37For the quarter of the cooperative banks with the highest HHI values, this industry accounts, on
average, for 25% of the lending volume. For the quarter with the lowest HHI values, this industry accounts
for 6.8%. For other specialization measures, we observe similar gures.
21if a negative relation between specialization level and MON is disclosed under the
assumption of no default, it should be valid under all other assumptions concerning
the insolvency rate of agriculture and forestry.
 We include all savings banks and cooperative banks with at least one year of obser-
vation. As the exclusion of banks with less than seven years of observation predom-
inantly relates to banks that have been taken over, we check whether the regression
results might be biased because of that.
 We restrict the data set to banks with 12 years of observations. As dierent obser-
vation periods might have specic characteristics not captured by our variables, for
example, the introduction of the new insolvency law in 1999,38 we use a balanced
data set and
 integrate dummies for dierent observation periods.
In order to analyze the stability of the relationship between specialization level and mon-
itoring quality over time,
 we divide the data set into two parts. The rst part comprises the time period
from 1995 to 2000 and the second part covers the period from 2001 to 2006 after a
new insolvency law had come into eect. Based on the average values of these time
periods, we run the regressions according to equation (9).39
 Furthermore, we conducted xed-eects estimations in order to exhaust the panel
data structure, though we stress that panel regressions are unfavorable in this special
case (see section 2.2).
The results of these analyses conrm the negative relationship between specialization level
and MONfai or MONdis.40 The results are not driven { at least not in an essential way {
by the specic data set and specialization benets prove to be stable over time.
38See, for example, Ehricke (2007).
39For these regressions, we exclude banks with less than four years of observation in the corresponding
time period in order to ensure a reliable calculation of the monitoring quality proxy. Alternatively, we
based the regressions on banks with 12 years of observation, which implies an equal set of banks for the
rst and second time period, and on banks with at least one year of observation. We note that the results
just vary marginally.
40The results will be provided by the authors on request.
22The model given by equation (9) is motivated mainly by economic factors. We are aware
that other variables may also have an inuence on the monitoring quality. The problem of
omitted variables cannot be solved entirely in an empirical analysis with real observations.
We checked whether the results concerning the specialization benets would change if we
introduced variables such as the share of customer deposits, the share of interbank loans,
a variable for the market structure, quadratic terms for the specialization level and size,
and a dierent measure of the market share. We also exchanged the personnel variable for
a variable which comprises all personnel expenses as endogeneity problems might be sus-
pected.41 We observe a stable negative relation between specialization level and monitoring
quality proxies. The same is true if variables are eliminated. Negative linear correlations
and rank correlations between the specialization level and the monitoring quality proxies
may be seen as a useful indication. We now present two slight modications of equation
(9):
 We skip the unsecured variable. As mentioned above, the specialization level might
also inuence the (subsequent) collateralization policy. Using unsecured as a control
variable does not allow us to see this possible eect.42
 We use the deviation of the banks' business district lending structure from the na-
tional lending benchmark (SM region) as a proxy for the banks' specialization level.
We want to examine whether specialization benets are bank-driven or depend just
on the loan structure of its business district.
Table 5 shows the results of the regressions without the unsecured variable as a control
variable and Table 6 shows the results of the regressions with SM region as the special-
ization measure.43
41Some of the explanatory variables in equation (29) (see appendix) are also used together with the
personnel variable to explain the monitoring quality.
42We have to note, that we do not control for dierences in collateralization rates between industries in
this case.
43We merely present the results for the most relevant variables. The complete results will be provided
by the authors on request.
23Table 5: Robustness checks of regression results (part one)
This table presents results (extract) of the regressions with MON
fai and MON
dis, respec-
tively, as the dependent variable according to equation (9) without the variable unsecured as




signicance at a 0:1%, 1%, 5% signicance level. The values in brackets are the corresponding
t-values.
MONfai as endogenous variable MONdis as endogenous variable
HHI HHIw Dnation Dregion HHI HHIw Dnation Dregion
cooperative banks
SM -0.217*** -0.207*** -0.293*** -0.175*** -0.141** -0.195*** -0.204*** -0.127***
(-5.34) (-6.37) (-6.60) (-4.97) (-3.29) (-5.18) (-4.26) (-3.42)
observations 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575
R2 0.242 0.241 0.245 0.226 0.129 0.144 0.133 0.124
savings banks
SM -0.037 -0.226*** -0.230*** -0.038 -0.011 -0.129** -0.136* -0.036
(-0.67) (-4.56) (-3.95) (-0.93) (-0.24) (-2.69) (-2.31) (-0.84)
mortgage -0.148** -0.126** -0.166*** -0.150** -0.278*** -0.265*** -0.288*** -0.277***
(-3.18) (-2.76) (-3.68) (-3.25) (-5.44) (-5.20) (-5.75) (-5.47)
observations 534 534 534 534 534 534 534 534
R2 0.230 0.262 0.255 0.230 0.188 0.198 0.197 0.188
Table 6: Robustness checks of regression results (part two)
This table presents results (extract) of the regressions with MON
fai and MON
dis, respec-
tively, as the dependent variable and SM region as the specialization measure according to
equation 9 after     standardization of the variables.
,
,
 indicate statistical sig-
nicance at a 0:1%, 1%, 5% signicance level. The values in brackets are the corresponding
t-values.
cooperative banks savings banks
MONfai MONdis MONfai MONdis
SM region -0.008 -0.040 -0.019 0.022
(-0.32) (-1.27) (-0.53) (0.60)
observations 1575 1575 534 534
R2 0.242 0.117 0.316 0.196
We cannot observe any major changes if we omit the variable unsecured compared to the
results of the regression based on equation (9). In the case of the savings banks, the
negative relationship between SM and MONfai is slightly stronger. It may be seen as a
weak indication that specialized savings banks are able to reduce their LGDs by higher
(subsequent) collateralization. For the savings banks, we also note a more pronounced
relationship between mortgage loan share and monitoring quality as the high collateral-
24ization rate in the case of mortgage loans is no longer represented by a further variable.
The results shown in Table 6 reveal that higher monitoring quality cannot be explained
solely by the regional industry composition. Specialization measurement should not rely on
business district gures even if we examine regionally restrained banks such as cooperative
and savings banks, but relate to bank-specic industry compositions.
All in all, we can conclude that specialization benets are stable over time and also prove
robust against data set and model variation.
3 Specialization benets vs. concentration risk
Below-average default probabilities due to a better monitoring do not necessarily imply a
lower portfolio risk. The reason is that monitoring is accompanied by a higher sectoral
concentration. In this section, we apply a commonly used credit risk model in order to
measure portfolio risk by the economic capital (EC) or unexpected loss. We dene EC
as the dierence between the value at risk given a 99.9% solvency probability and the
expected loss of the portfolio. Since this risk measure focuses on the adverse tail of the
loss distribution, the risk of sectoral concentrations is automatically taken into account.
3.1 Methodology
In order to measure the EC, we apply the one-period default-mode version of the widely
used multi-factor Gaussian copula model. It is a stylized version of an asset value model
that belongs to the class of conditionally independent factor models (see Sch onbucher
(2001)). Credit risk materializes only in default events after a one-year period. Defaults
are triggered in this static model if the ability-to-pay variable Yn of the n th borrower
falls below a default threshold n.
Yn = r  Xs(n) +
p
1   r2  Un: (11)
Yn depends on a single systematic risk factor Xs(n) and an idiosyncratic risk factor Un. Yn
is standard normal since both risk factors are pairwise independent and standard normally
distributed by assumption. The mapping s : f1;:::;Ng ! f1;:::;Sg uniquely assigns every
borrower to an industry sector. The systematic risk factors are jointly standard normal
25distributed with correlation matrix 
. The asset correlation between any pair of rms in
the same sector is given by r2.
Since Yn is standard normally distributed, the default barrier n can be inferred from the
probability of default (PD) pn(t),
n =  1 (pn); (12)
where () 1 denotes the inverse of the cumulative standard normal distribution function.
Since we have neither information on the loan sizes nor the PDs of individual borrowers, we
employ a slightly more restricted version of the model which allows us to compute the VaR
very eciently by a numerical approximation developed in Cespedes et al. (2006). They
assume that the portfolio is innitely ne-grained in every industry sector, i.e. idiosyncratic
risk is eliminated through diversication across single borrowers. In this case, EC can be
approximated by multiplying the economic capital of the bank in a single risk factor model
(EC
sf
b ) by a calibration factor (CF(DIb;b)) which, in turn, depends on two variables:























The weight wb;j of each sector is the relative weight of all loans in that sector relative
to the total loan volume of the bank's portfolio. The parameter   denotes the expected
loss given default which we assume to be constant in the cross-section and also over time.
Since the application of the EC formula requires inputs on sector level, we use the expected
default rate ^ pj instead of pn.
The diversication index DIb in (13) is dened as a Herndahl-Hirschman-Index over


























The calibration factor in (13) is dened as a second-order polynomial. Its coecients are
calibrated in Cespedes et al. (2006) by Monte-Carlo simulations:
CFb(DIb;b) = 1 0:852(1 b)(1 DIb)+0:426(1 b)2 (1 DIb) 0:481(1 b)2 (1 DIb)2:
(18)
In order to measure the impact of the monitoring eect we dierentiate between the PD
without monitoring pn and the PD pmon
b;n after monitoring. The latter is dened by
pmon
b;n = aSM pn e1 SMb SM1: (19)
1 stands for the regression coecients of the specialization level which stem from the
the monitoring quality regressions in section 2.4. We revert to the regressions which are
based on the failure rate as the rate of distressed loans has several shortcomings and use
regression results without     standardization of the variables. SM1 represents the
lowest specialization level. The scaling factor aSM ensures that the exposure-weighted
average PD of all cooperative banks and savings banks, respectively, after monitoring is





b Xb e1 SMb SM1
; (20)
where Xb denotes the average loan exposure of bank b and aSM is calculated separately
for cooperative banks and savings banks.
3.2 Data
As in section 2 of the paper, the sector weights are based on the loan exposure data of
the German borrower statistics. The expected loss given default   is set to 0.45, which is
in line with the value in the foundation version of the internal ratings based approach in
Basel II. The sector-dependent expected default rate ^ pj is approximated by the sector's
observed default rate, taken from the Federal Statistical Oce (Destatis).
The inter-sector correlations collected in the correlation matrix 
 are estimated from the
sample correlations of stock index returns of the respective industrial sectors. We use the
27ICB sector scheme of 16 sectors which allows us to use the Eurostoxx stock indices.44 The
sample correlations are estimated from weekly stock index returns over two years. As a
robustness check, we use also an average correlation matrix. The correlation r2 with the
systematic risk factor in (11) is determined through the following calibration argument.
We assume an average pairwise asset correlation   of 9%, based on empirical ndings in
Hahnenstein (2004). Then, the value of r is calculated as
q
 




Firstly, we present the results for the relationship between specialization level and economic
capital, where we do not adjust for monitoring. Table 7 shows the corresponding linear
correlations between specialization level and the average EC over the observation period.45
Table 7: Correlations between specialization level and economic capital
This table presents correlations between specialization level and economic capital, where
the PDs are not adjusted for monitoring quality and the economic capital is averaged over
the observation period. EC
av
is based on the correlations, averaged over the observation
period, between the systematic risk factors and EC
an
on the two-year correlation matrices.
 indicates statistical signicance at the 1% signicance level.
HHI HHIw Dnation Dregion
cooperative banks
EC
an 0.126? 0.320? 0.097? -0.004
EC
av 0.134? 0.331? 0.109? -0.001
savings banks
EC
an 0.200? 0.455? 0.063 -0.045
EC
av 0.202? 0.462? 0.063 -0.050
In most cases, we can observe the expected result: A higher specialization level is ac-
companied by a higher economic capital. Signicantly positive correlations in the case
of HHI and HHIw and insignicantly positive correlations for Dnation can be stated for
both cooperative banks and savings banks. However, in the case of Dregion, a insignicant
negative relation with EC is detected. This result can be explained by the fact that banks
44The sector classication of the borrower statistic is mapped to this ICB sector scheme.
45Using Spearman rank correlations instead of linear correlations does not make a big dierence in this
case.
28with larger deviations from their regional benchmark lend mainly to low-risk industry sec-
tors, indicated by a negative correlation between ECsf and Dregion. We further note that
using the average correlations between the systematic risk factors instead of the two-year
correlation matrices does not seem to have a major impact on the results.
Henceforth, we consider dierent monitoring quality levels. In Table 8 we present   by
analogy with Table 7   the correlations between specialization level and economic capital,
this time adjusted for monitoring according to equations (19) and (20).
Table 8: Correlations between specialization level and economic capital with
monitoring-adjusted probabilities of default
This table presents correlations between specialization level and economic capital, where
the PDs are adjusted for monitoring quality and the economic capital is averaged over the
observation period. EC
av
is based on the correlations, averaged over the observation pe-
riod, between the systematic risk factors and EC
an
on the two-year correlation matrices.

indicates statistical signicance at the 1% signicance level.
HHI HHIw Dnation Dregion
cooperative banks
EC
(an;SM) -0.388? -0.216? -0.564? -0,435?
EC
(av;SM) -0.382? -0.207? -0.559? -0.432?
savings banks
EC
(an;SM) 0.147? 0.164? -0.255? -0.102
EC
(av;SM) 0.150? 0.174? -0.252? -0.106
Considering monitoring advantages for specialized banks is accompanied by signicantly
negative relationships between specialization level and EC for all specialization measures in
the case of the cooperative banks. The higher the specialization level is   measured either
by Hirschman Herndahl indices or by distance measures   the lower the portfolio risk
is on average. That tells us that specialization benets overcompensate the concentration
disadvantages. For the distance measures, we see a stronger negative dependency than for
the naive specialization measures. Distance measures show a comparatively weak linkage
to the diversication index DI and, at the same time, a strong linkage to monitoring
quality, as we observed in Table 9. All in all, specialized cooperative banks tend to have
a lower portfolio risk than diversied cooperative banks.
In the case of the savings banks, the results are more heterogeneous. We have to dier-
entiate between specialization based on Hirschman Herndahl indices and specialization
29in terms of deviations from national or regional benchmarks. For the HHI and HHIw, we
see signicantly positive correlations between specialization level and economic capital.
A higher naive diversication is accompanied by a lower portfolio risk. Particularly for
the HHIw with its high specialization benets, this might be somewhat surprising. The
result can be explained by the fact that high HHIw values are achieved especially if a large
portion of the credit portfolio is assigned to a risky industry sector which implies a pos-
itive relationship between HHIw and average PD (before considering monitoring eects)
of the portfolio. For the distance measures, we can observe negative correlations between
specialization level and EC, which are statistically signicant in the case of Dnation. Sav-
ings banks characterized by large deviations from the national loan portfolio benchmark
exploit specialization benets and tend to have lower portfolio risks.
Why do cooperative banks show similar results for HHI measures and distance measures in
contrast to savings banks where opposing results have been detected for HHI and distance
measures? In Table 12 of section 5.3, the correlations between the dierent specializa-
tion measures are depicted. We can see high correlations between HHI measures and
distance measures for cooperative banks indicating a strong positive dependence whereas
low values for savings banks reveal dierent assessment of specialization by HHI and dis-
tance measures. Cooperative banks are on average exposed to a high specialization level,
demonstrated both by high HHI values and high deviations from regional and national
benchmarks as can be seen in Table 1. To gain relatively high HHI values compared
to other cooperative banks, a cooperative bank has to be extremely exposed to certain
industry sectors. As regional and national benchmarks are relatively balanced with re-
spect to the industry sector composition, comparably high HHI values are accompanied
by comparably high deviations from the benchmarks. For savings banks, more moder-
ate specialization levels have been presented by Table 1, which means that a relatively
high naive concentration can be achieved without an extreme focus on certain industry
sectors. Thus, high HHI values do not have to be accompanied by high deviations from
regional and national benchmarks which explains the lower dependence between naive
specialization measures and distance measures for savings banks compared to cooperative
banks.
So far, we have considered the average EC over the observation period. However, there
might be huge dierences between the economic capital values over time, and it is possible
30to doubt whether the predominantly negative relation between specialization level and
economic capital still holds in a recession when concentration risks materialize. Therefore,
we calculate the correlation coecients for the annual portfolio risk values, too. In Table 9,
the results are summarized by presenting the median, minimum and maximum value of
the correlations.
Table 9: Summary statistics of time series of correlations between specialization
level and annual economic capital
This table presents median, minimum, and maximum of the correlations between special-
ization level and annual economic capital over the observation period, where the PDs are
adjusted for monitoring quality. EC
(an;SM)
t is based on the two-year correlation matrices.






t -0.369? -0.410? -0.242?
EC
(an;HHIw)
t -0.193? -0.264? -0.031
EC
(an;Dnation)
t -0.533? -0.570? -0.420?
EC
(an;Dregion)




t 0.137? 0.093 0.207?
EC
(an;HHIw)
t 0.164? 0.041 0.298?
EC
(an;Dnation)
t -0.229? -0.317? -0.171?
EC
(an;Dregion)
t -0.107 -0.141? -0.041
It is noteworthy that the robustness of the earlier results is largely conrmed. Specialized
cooperative banks tend to have a lower portfolio risk than diversied cooperative banks
in each year of the observation period as can be derived by the fact that the maximum
correlation coecients are negative. The same is true for the savings banks if the spe-
cialization level is measured by one of the distance measures. The minimum correlation
coecients are positive in the case of the Hirschman Herndahl indices, which means that
the positive relationship between naive specialization level and economic capital in the
case of the savings banks is robust over time.
At the end of this section, we briey remark that further robustness checks have been
performed:
 We exclude banks which have a specialization level lower than the 1%-quantile or
above the 99%-quantile.
31 Instead of assuming a multivariate normal distribution for the joint distribution of
the systematic risk factors, we assumed that the dependency between the risk factors
is given by a t-copula with three degrees of freedom and run simulations to evaluate
the economic capital. By doing so, we considered a more realistic distribution of the
portfolio losses and detected possible eects of fat tails on the relationship between
specialization level and portfolio risk.
 Firstly, we applied a higher correlation r2 = 0:25. Secondly, we performed analyses
based on sector-specic r2s.
 We performed analyses based on sector-specic monitoring adjustments.
We stress that the stability of the earlier results is conrmed by these robustness checks.46
4 Conclusions
This paper investigates the cumulative impact of benets from industry sector special-
ization and from associated sectoral credit concentrations on the credit risk of banks'
loan portfolios. The empirical analysis is based on a comprehensive sample of German
cooperative banks and savings banks. It comprises two parts.
In the rst part, we apply a linear regression model in order to explore whether banks
specializing in industry sectors can reap signicant screening and monitoring benets.
The monitoring quality is measured by the ratio of the observed actual loss rate to the
expected loss rate. The expected loss rate is calculated as the average of default rates of
industry sectors, weighted by the nominal credit volume per sector. We use four dierent
specialization measures, i.e. two Hirschman-Herndahl indices (HHI and HHIw) and
two distance measures (Dnation and Dregion). The HHI is based on loan exposures per
sector, whereas the HHIw is based on loan exposures per industry sector, weighted by the
default rates of the sector. Dnation refers to deviations from a national lending benchmark
and Dregion refers to deviations from the lending benchmark of the region in which the
bank operates. Furthermore, we apply two proxies for the actual loss rate, based on the
relative share of either distressed loans or new loan loss provisions.
46More detailed information will be provided by the authors on request.
32In the second part, we analyze the relationship between specialization level and economic
capital where dierences in monitoring quality between banks with respect to their spe-
cialization level are provided by the rst part. Credit concentrations are automatically
taken into account by using a multi-factor asset value model of credit risk together with
the value at risk as risk measure.
The rst part of our empirical analyses conrms signicant monitoring benets for both
specialized cooperative banks and specialized savings banks. Dierences between the re-
sults for dierent specialization measures are small. For savings banks, we nd a weaker
relationship between specialization level and monitoring quality when compared with co-
operative banks. There is statistical signicance in four out of eight cases, i.e. there
are larger dierences between the results for dierent specialization measures: HHIw and
Dnation show signicant, and HHI and Dregion show insignicant results. The discrep-
ancy between the results for HHI and HHIw might indicate that savings banks gear their
monitoring eorts more to the related risk than to the volume of a loan exposure. The
relationship between specialization level and monitoring quality is stronger if the actual
loss rate is based on new loan loss provisions than on distressed loans. Considering that
the actual loss rate based on the distressed loans does not consider the impact of dierent
LGDs, this nding suggests that the LGD, in particular, is inuenced by the specialization
level and that the PD impact of specializing in certain industries is rather small. Various
additional checks conrm that these results are robust against variations of the data set
and the model.
The results of the second part are somewhat ambiguous since they dier between cooper-
ative banks and savings banks. Before considering monitoring advantages for specialized
banks, a positive relationship between specialization level and economic capital prevails,
except for Dregion because banks with larger deviations from the regional benchmark lend
mainly to low-risk industries. After considering monitoring advantages, we nd that a
higher specialization level reduces portfolio risk measured by economic capital for the
sample of cooperative banks. In this case the specialization benets outweigh the concen-
tration risk. In the case of the savings banks, however, results are mixed and strongly
depend on the used specialization measure. For the two specialization measures HHI and
HHIw, economic capital tends to increase for more specialized banks, but this result is not
signicant. For the two distance measures the relationship is converse as it is for coopera-
33tive banks. Only for the distance measure Dregion, this negative relationship is statistically
signicant. The robustness checks show that these results are stable over time and prove
robust against various model variations. In summary, we nd empirical support that it
is possible for a substantial number of banks to overcompensate the higher concentration
risk implied by a specialized lending strategy through the associated monitoring benets.
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375 Appendix
5.1 Denition of control variables
Share of loans:
loan :=
loan amount (without interbank loans)
total assets
(21)
Share of retail loans:
retail :=
retail loan amount
loan amount (without interbank loans)
(22)
Share of local authority loans:
local authority :=
amount of local authority loans
loan amount
(23)
Share of mortgage loans:
mortgage :=
amount of mortgage loans
loan amount (without interbank loans)
(24)
Unsecured portion in case of audited specic doubtful loans:
unsecured :=
unsecured volume of audited spec doubtful loans
amount of audited specic doubtful loans
(25)
The average market share (market) which can be attributed to a savings or cooperative




ms(b;i;t)  x(b;i;t) (26)







where X(b;i;t) stands for the loan amount of bank b in industry i at time t. market denotes
the portion of the bank's loan volume in industry i as a share of the total loan volume in
the region in industry i at time t. It therefore considers the market shares of a bank in all
38the industries, but weights with respect to the portion which each industry contributes to
the corporate loan volume of the bank.47
To evaluate the personnel expenses which contribute to the corporate lending activities, we
follow the methodology of Coleman et al. (2006).48 By running a xed-eects estimation,
we adjust the ratio of personnel expenses over non-interest rate expenses for specic bank




non interest rate expenses (b;t)
(28)
and perform the following xed-eects estimation in order to assess the proxy for the
personnel expenses assigned to corporate lending (personnel):
SER(b;t) = personnelb +
8 X
j=1
j  Y(j;b;t) + (b;t): (29)
SER is adjusted for dierent inuencing factors so that the time-constant bank-proprietary
term (personnel) shows the expenses (additionally adjusted for size and eciency eects)
for the corporate loan business of a bank. We use the share of retail loans (retail) and
the share of interbank loans (interbank loan) as control variables. We assume that the
rst ratio has a positive inuence on SER because a higher ratio is probably characterized
by lower revenues per employee and, therefore, a higher personnel intensity. The second
ratio might tend to be negatively correlated with SER because of the more standardized
business and higher transaction volumes. The share of loans in total assets (loan) and the
share of fees in total earnings (fee) represent major bank characteristics. Both variables
are indicators for the labor-intensity of the bank's business and should inuence the SER
positively.49 We also consider the share of liabilities against banks in total assets (inter-
bank liabilities) and the share of securitized liabilities in total assets (securitized liabilities).
Owing to the expected labor-intensity, we assume a negative relationship with SER for the
47Therefore, a high market-value could stem from just one industry. However, by introducing the
specialization measures, we shall control for this circumstance.
48Coleman et al. (2006) use the the personnel expenses which contribute to the corporate lending activ-
ities as a proxy for the monitoring quality.
49Here, and in the remainder of the paper, we have performed robustness tests to check for the relevance
of endogeneity. Leaving out certain variables in the regressions, we have so far noted no major changes in
the results.
39rst and a positive relationship for the second variable. In order to measure the eciency
of a bank, we resort to the return on total assets (return ratio). For a more protable
bank we assume a lower SER-value. The control variable size reects the fact that bigger
banks might benet from economies of scale.50
The results of the estimation based on equation 29 are stated in Table 10.
Table 10: Regression results for personnel as the dependent variable




 indicate statistical signicance at a 0:1%, 1%, 5% signicance
level. The values in brackets are the corresponding t-values.
(1) (2) (3)
cooperative banks savings banks both banking groups
loan -0.043*** -0.046*** -0.043***
(-5.42) (-3.53) (-6.42)
retail -0.028*** 0.026 -0.015*
(-3.70) (1.90) (-2.34)
interbank loan 0.057*** 0.028*** 0.049***
(9.25) (3.32) (9.57)
fee 0.267*** 0.433*** 0.295***
(16.39) (12.76) (20.31)
securitized liability -0.104*** -0.024 -0.113***
(-5.64) (-0.93) (-7.43)
interbank liability -0.005 -0.017 0.002
(-0.53) (-1.58) (0.27)
size -0.020*** 0.005 -0.018***
(-14.03) (1.91) (-13.86)
return ratio -3.537*** -0.058 -3.110***
(-25.02) (-0.23) (-25.19)
observations 17454 6059 23513
R2 0.08 0.08 0.07
For the variables loan, fee, securitized liabilities, interbank liabilities, and return ratio we
can observe the expected relations with the variable personnel. For the share of retail
loans there is a positive, albeit not statistically signicant, link in the case of the savings
banks. In the case of the cooperative banks, a signicantly negative relationship has to
be noted. Servicing retail clients is possibly linked to lower-paid employees. Banks with
a larger share of interbank loans on average have   contrary to our assumption   higher
personnel values. This indicates that a renancing-focused business model is personnel-
intensive. The results for size are as expected for the cooperative banks, higher values are
50In Coleman et al. (2006), similar control variables are used.
40accompanied by lower personnel values. The relationship between bank size and personnel
is insignicantly positive for the savings banks. This could stem from the fact that savings
banks are, on average, six times as tall (w.r.t. the asset size) as cooperative banks and
xed costs degression eects are counteracted by extra organizational costs in this size
cluster. It is also imaginable that especially the big savings banks look for highly qualied
employees working as specialists and are willing to pay more for these.
5.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 11: Summary statistics of variables based on bank means (1995-2006)
This table presents summary statistics of variables based on average values per bank for the
time period 1995-2006. p5 (p95) stands for the 5th (95th) percentile. The variable agglom
combines agglom1 and agglom2. agglom takes the values 1,2 or 3 if the business district is
an urban agglomeration, an urban area or a rural area.
savings banks cooperative banks both banking groups
mean median mean median p5 p95
total assets in mill. e 1,700 1,100 280 160 32 2,400
loan 0.66 0.68 0.72 0.74 0.52 0.83
retail 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.36 0.0,70
local authority 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.13
mortgage 0.41 0.41 0.30 0.30 0.07 0.53
unsecured 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.28 0.61
market 0.15 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.33
agglom 1.80 . 1.86 . . .
east 0.17 . 0.07 . . .
5.3 Correlation matrices
Table 12: Correlations between specialization measures
This table presents correlations between specialization measures based on average values per
bank for the time period 1995-2006.
? indicates statistical signicance at the 1% signicance
level.
cooperative banks savings banks
HHI HHIw Dnation Dregion HHI HHIw Dnation Dregion
HHI 1 1
HHIw 0.745? 1 0.586? 1
Dnation 0.775? 0.626? 1 0.331? 0.447? 1


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































42Table 14: Rank correlations between specialization measures and selected con-
trol variables
This table presents rank correlations (Spearman) between specialization measures and some
control variables based on average values per bank for the time period 1995-2006.
? indicates
statistical signicance at the 1% signicance level.
cooperative banks savings banks
HHI HHIw Dnation Dregion HHI HHIw Dnation Dregion
MONfai -0.308? -0.283? -0.383? -0.329? -0.120? -0.217? -0.287? -0.182?
MONdis -0.197? -0.237? -0.187? -0.161? -0.065 ? -0.138? -0.007 -0.022
loan -0.231? -0.186? -0.269? -0.142? -0.096 -0.285? -0.073 0.053
retail 0.046 0.119? 0.221? 0.252? 0.056 0.113? 0.258? 0.147?
mortgage -0.193? -0.124? -0.174? -0.069? 0.155? 0.191? 0.082 0.188?
unsecured -0.033 -0.033 -0.066? -0.029 -0.030 -0.065 -0.228? -0.146?
market -0.198? -0.194? -0.333? -0.571? -0.089 -0.137? -0.391? -0.583?
size -0.556? -0.486? -0.726? -0.607? -0.283? -0.440? -0.653? -0.447?
east 0.100? 0.219? 0.040 -0.063 0.168? 0.376? -0.056 -0.117?
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